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1. The Federal Constitution and the Federal State:
An Overview
The Republic of Austria, founded in 1918 with the political will
of the constituent Länder1 and re-founded  in 1945 at the end of the
Second World War, belongs to the “classical” European federal sys-
tems.2
1. See P. Pernthaler, Die Staatsgründungsakte der österreichischen Bundesländer, Braumül-
ler, Vienna, 1979; K. Weber, “Die Entwicklung des österreichischen Bundesstaates", in: H.
Schambeck (ed.), Bundesstaat und Bundesrat in Österreich, Verlag Österreich, Vienna,
1997, 37 ff.; K. Edtstadler, “Das Werden des Bundesstaates”, in: H. Schambeck (ed.), Bundes-
staat..., cit., 23 ff.; P. Bußjäger, Landesverfas sung und Landespolitik in Vorarlberg – Die
Verfassungsgeschichte Vorarlbergs und ihre Auswirkungen auf die Landespolitik 1848 –
2002, W. Neugebauer, Graz/Feldkirch, 2004.
2. Together with Germany, Switzerland and, more recently, Belgium. Moreover, strongly
decentralized states, such as Spain and Italy, nearly approach the – very vague and contro-
versial – standard of a federal system.
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The Federal Constitution comprises the Federal Constitutional
Act (Bundes-Verfassungsgesetz, hence B-VG), enacted in 1920,3 a large
number of additional federal constitutional laws or constitutional pro-
visions within ordinary federal laws. There are also several laws dating
back to the former Austro-Hungarian monarchy, which ended in 1918.
Together with certain international treaties, these also have the status
of federal constitutional law. Apart from the period of Austro-fascism
(1934 - 1938) and the period of occupation (1938 - 1945), the B-VG
has been in force since 1920. It was re-enacted after the Second World
War in 1945, again with the support of the constituent Länder, and
has since been amended 93 times.4
Constitutional doctrine and jurisprudence recognise certain fun-
damental constitutional principles: democracy, federalism, the rule of
law, republicanism, the separation of powers and human rights.5 These
principles are even better protected than “ordinary” federal constitu-
tional law. Federal constitutional law can be amended by a qualified
majority of two-thirds of the votes cast, in the presence of at least
half the members.6 A referendum is compulsory, however, if the fun-
damental principles are significantly modified or abolished; this is un-
derstood as a “total revision” of the constitution within the terms of
Art 44 para 3 B-VG. Such a referendum took place when Austria joined
the European Union in 1995. EU membership necessitated a range of
modifications to the Austrian legal system, including the principle of
federalism.
Austria is a strongly unitary and symmetric federal state, being
classified among the most centralized federal states worldwide.7 The
3. See F. Ermacora, Die Entstehung der Bundesverfassung 1920, 4 vols., Braumüller, Vien-
na, 1986-1990.
4. An overview of Austrian constitutional law is given by R. Walter/H. Mayer, Grundriß des
österreichischen Bundesverfassungsrechts9, Manz, Vienna, 2000; L. Adamovich et alii,
Österreichisches Staatsrecht, 3 vols., Springer, Vienna/New York, 1997-2003; T. Öhlinger,
Verfassungsrecht6, WUV, Vienna, 2005; P. Pernthaler, Österreichisches Bundesstaatsrecht,
Verlag Österreich, Vienna, 2004; W. Berka, Lehrbuch Verfassungsrecht, Springer, Vienna,
2005.
5. Some, but not all of these principles are explicitly proclaimed in the Federal Constitution:
For instance, Art 2 B-VG stipulates that “Austria is a federal state” that consists of the nine
Länder.
6. Art 44 para 1 B-VG.
7. K. Loewenstein, Verfassungslehre3, Mohr, Tübingen, 1975; R. Watts, Comparing Federal
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nine constituent Länder are vested with both legislative and adminis-
trative powers, including the residual competence and constitutional
autonomy, but they do not partake in the judiciary.8 They have parlia-
ments and governments of their own and are represented in the sec-
ond chamber (Bundesrat or Federal Council) of the federal parliament
which, however, is an excessively inefficient instrument for the repre-
sentation of their interests.9 The federation has much stronger powers10
and is also entitled to supervise11 the law-making of the Länder to a
certain extent which makes them appear almost subordinate. The Län-
der are somehow compensated for their lack of strong powers by the
system of “indirect federal administration”12 that obliges the Land
governors and subordinate Land authorities to perform federal admi-
nistrative matters on behalf of the federation. Although, in this case,
the Land governors are bound to observe instructions of the federal
government and ministers and although they do not execute the laws
of their own Land, the system of indirect federal administration enlar-
ges the executive sphere of the Länder. The power to regulate finan-
cial equalisation is confined to the federation,13 and, although Financial
Equalisation Acts are traditionally negotiated by the representatives
of the three territorial entities (federation, Länder, municipalities),
Systems2, McGill, Montreal et alii, 1999; A. Gamper, “Österreich – Das Paradoxon des zen-
tralistischen Bundesstaates”, in: Europäisches Zentrum für Föderalismus-Forschung Tübingen
(ed.), Jahrbuch des Föderalismus 2000, Nomos, Baden-Baden, 2000, 251 ff.; R. Sturm, “Aus-
tria”, in: A. Griffiths (ed.), Handbook of Federal Countries, 2002, McGill, Montreal et alii,
2002, 45 ff.; P. Bußjäger, “Der “zentralistischste aller Bundesstaaten” als (Lehr)Beispiel für
Europa? Der Fall Österreich”, in: M. Piazolo/J. Weber (eds.), Föderalismus – Leitbild für die
Europäische Union?, Olzog, Munich, 2004, 128 ff.; P. Pernthaler/A. Gamper, “National fed-
eralism within the EU: the Austrian experience”, in: S. Ortino et alii (eds.), The Changing
Faces of Federalism, Manchester University Press, Manchester, 2005, 134 ff.
8. On the allocation of powers and constitutional autonomy see, with more detail, P. Pern-
thaler, Österreichisches Bundesstaatsrecht, cit., 313 ff. and 459 ff.
9. See H. Schambeck (ed.), Bundestaat und Bundesrat in Österreich, Verlag Österreich,
Vienna, 1997; H. Schäffer, “The Austrian Bundesrat: Constitutional Law – Political Reality
– Reform Ideas”, in: U. Karpen (ed.), Role and Function of the Second Chamber, Nomos,
Baden-Baden, 1999, 25 ff.
10. Particularly, but not exclusively, those that are enumerated by Art 10 para 1 B-VG.
11. See P. Pernthaler, Österreichisches Bundesstaatsrecht, cit., 483 ff.
12. Art 102 B-VG. See also K. Weber, Die mittelbare Bundesverwaltung, Braumüller, Vienna,
1987; B. Raschauer, “Artikel 102 B-VG”, in: K. Korinek/M. Holoubek (eds.), Österreichisches
Bundesverfassungsrecht, Springer, Vienna/New York, 2001; P. Bußjäger, “Artikel 102 B-VG”,
in: H.P. Rill/H. Schäffer (eds.), Bundesverfassungsrecht, Verlag Österreich, Vienna, 2002.
13. § 3 Finanz-Verfassungsgesetz.
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these federal acts usually allocate the most profitable taxes at the fed-
eral level, leaving to the Länder hardly any important taxes of their
own and making them thus depend on shares in joint federal taxes
and on federal subsidies and allotments.14 A range of intergovernmen-
tal instruments, however, improves the weak position of the Länder.15
Their intergovernmental conferences, above all the powerful Conference
of Länder governors, together with the Liaison Office of the Länder
prove strong instruments that co-ordinate their interests and in a co-
operative spirit represent them vis-à-vis the federation. The Länder
may also conclude formal treaties16 with each other and with the fed-
eration which is helpful to harmonise legislation despite the frag-
mented allocation of powers, and they may participate in the process
of EU law-making.17
2. The Reform Process until 1995
The “decline of federalism” began shortly after the enactment
of the B-VG in 1920. A number of federal constitutional amendments
transferred Länder powers to the federation and restricted the financial
and constitutional autonomy of the Länder.18 This development con-
tinued in the “Second Republic” after 1945 and even after the State
Treaty of Vienna (1955) when Austria regained her full sovereignty.
Increasing centralisation of Länder powers – in particular matters re-
lated to the supervision and steering of economic development – even
14. See, comprehensively, P. Pernthaler, Österreichisches Bundesstaatsrecht, cit., 391 ff.
15. See K. Weber, “Macht im Schatten? (Landeshauptmänner-, Landesamtsdirektoren und
andere Landesreferentenkonferenzen)”, ÖZP 1992, 405 ff.; A. Rosner, Koordinationsin-
strumente der österreichischen Länder, Braumüller, Vienna, 2000; G. Meirer, Die Verbin-
dungsstelle der Bundesländer oder Die gewerkschaftliche Organisierung der Länder, Brau-
müller, Vienna, 2003; P. Bußjäger, “Föderalismus durch Macht im Schatten? – Österreich
und die Landeshauptmännerkonferenz”, in: Europäisches Zentrum für Föderalismus-
Forschung Tübingen (ed.), Jahrbuch des Föderalismus 2003, Nomos, Baden-Baden, 2003,
79 ff.
16. Art 15a B-VG. See also R. Thienel, "Artikel 15a B-VG", in: K. Korinek/M. Holoubek (eds.),
Österreichisches Bundesverfassungsrecht, Springer, Vienna/New York, 2000.
17. Art 23d B-VG. See also T. Öhlinger, "Artikel 23d", in: K. Korinek/M. Holoubek (eds.),
Österreichisches..., cit.
18. See P. Pernthaler, "Verfassungsentwicklung und Verfassungsreform in Österreich", in:
B. Wieser/A. Stolz (eds.), Verfassungsrecht und Verfassungsgerichtsbarkeit an der Schwelle
zum 21. Jahrhundert, Verlag Österreich, Vienna, 2000, 67 ff. (101).
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inspired academics to speak of a “creeping total revision”,19 meaning
a process where the constitutional principle of federalism was under-
mined by a wide range of smaller constitutional amendments that,
taken as single measures, did not amount to a “total revision” and
therefore did not require a compulsory referendum.
The Länder developed their own strategies against this process
of centralisation: They strove for co-operation and solutions through
negotiation, seeking to move the federal government to accept step-
by-step reform bills that were, however, submitted by the Länder with
the view towards overall reform. In 1964, 1970 and 1976 the Länder
Governors presented comprehensive reform programs that were
followed by a “catalogue of demands” in 1985.20 Several Länder
parliaments also passed resolutions that demanded a reform of the
Austrian federal system. In addition to these official statements,
citizens’ initiatives in the Länder Tyrol and Vorarlberg claimed more
rights for the Länder, and in Vorarlberg even a referendum took place
on this issue. The federal government, on its part, presented
“counterclaims” part of which, however, were dropped even before
negotiations.21
The Länder succeeded to trigger off a couple of constitutional
amendments in their favour. The first of these constitutional amend-
ments that became law in 1974 was probably the most sweeping: It
vested the Länder with the right to conclude formal treaties with each
other and with the federation respectively, and strengthened their
powers and organisational autonomy as well as the system of indirect
federal administration. Further amendments (1977, 1981, 1983/84,
1987/88, 1990 - 1994) improved the position of the Länder in certain
aspects, such as granting some additional powers and constitutional
autonomy, the (very limited) right to conclude international treaties
19. See, for example, F. Ermacora, Der Verfassungsgerichtshof, Styria, Graz et alii, 1956;
L. Adamovich/H. Spanner, Handbuch des österreichischen Verfassungsrechts5, Springer,
Vienna/New York, 1957; P. Pernthaler, Der Verfassungskern, Manz, Vienna, 1998, 70 ff.
20. See P. Pernthaler, Das Forderungsprogramm der österreichischen Bundesländer, Brau-
müller, Vienna, 1980; K. Berchtold, Die Verhandlungen zum Forderungsprogramm der
Bundesländer seit 1956, Braumüller, Vienna, 1988; T. Thanner, "Bundesstaatsreform und
Forderungsprogramme der Bundesländer", in: H. Schambeck (ed.), Bundesstaat und Bun-
desrat in Österreich, Verlag Österreich, Vienna, 1997, 275 ff.
21. See P. Pernthaler, Verfassungsentwicklung..., cit., 103.
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and the Federal Council’s absolute veto in the case of further loss of
Länder powers. Although the federation also gained some new powers
in exchange for Länder powers, the process of centralisation and in-
creasing federal interference in the organisational affairs of the Länder
could be basically brought to a halt. At the same time, the Länder re-
vived their constitutional autonomy by creating new Land constitu-
tional provisions concerning human rights, citizen participation, state
aims and the political system of the Länder. Co-operative federalism
increasingly gained more and more importance, which was facilitated
by the establishment of a liaison office for the Länder as well as a
wide range of interregional conferences – with the conference of the
Land governors as the politically most relevant, though informal body.
A couple of years before Austria joined the European Union
– which happened in 1995 – a reform of the system of Austrian fed-
eralism had been inseparably linked to the discussion on an accession
to the EU.22 Facing loss of competences in areas that were to be mainly
regulated by the EU instead of the Land parliaments in the future,
the Länder demanded to be compensated by an internal reform of
federalism, a co-operative accession process and the establishment of
an effective Länder participation procedure in EU matters. The fed-
eral government agreed to a “minor” reform that comprised a treaty
between the federation and the Länder in EU matters23 (that was
supplemented by another EU-related treaty concluded “horizontally”
by the Länder24), the constitutional enactment of the EU participation
procedure of the Länder25 and the establishment of certain co-opera-
tive advisory bodies26 as well as the new Land (hitherto federal) power
22. See, for example, W. Burtscher, EG-Beitritt und Föderalismus, Braumüller, Vienna, 1990;
F. Staudigl, "Zur Rolle der österreichischen Länder im europäischen Integrationsprozess",
ZÖR 46 (1993), 41 ff.; P. Pernthaler (ed.), Auswirkungen eines EG-Beitrittes auf die födera-
listische Struktur Österreichs, Braumüller, Vienna, 1989; P. Pernthaler (ed.), Bundesstaats-
reform als Instrument der Verwaltungsreform und des europäischen Föderalismus, Brau-
müller, Vienna, 1997.
23. Vereinbarung zwischen dem Bund und den Ländern gemäß Art 15a B-VG über die
Mitwirkungsrechte der Länder und Gemeinden in Angelegenheiten der europäischen In-
tegration.
24. Vereinbarung zwischen den Ländern gemäß Art 15a B-VG über die gemeinsame Wil-
lensbildung der Länder in Angelegenheiten der europäischen Integration.
25. See, in particular, Art 23d B-VG.
26. Namely, Rat für Fragen der österreichischen Integrations- und Außenpolitik and Ar-
beitsgruppe für Integrationsfragen.
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to regulate the transfer of building plots.27 A more comprehensive
(“structural”) reform of federalism was theoretically prepared by a
joint commission at the Federal Chancellor’s Office28 and politically
agreed in 1992 (“pact of Perchtoldsdorf”), even tabled in the Federal
Parliament (three times altogether), but in the end without succeed-
ing to become law, due to ultimate political unanimity on single re-
form issues and the loss of the constitutional majority of the coalition
government.29 The Länder, however, consented to join the European
Union and have since suffered from the dreaded loss of policy-making
power, the erosion of power of Land parliaments and the predom-
inance of the executives. Moreover, the federal government exerts a
new supervisory role as it represents the Republic externally, provid-
es information and co-ordinates joint implementation in those new
“complex matters” that have a homogeneous basis in EU law but are
confronted by the fragmented Austrian distribution of powers so that
both the federation and the Länder may be responsible for the imple-
mentation of the respective aspects of an EU directive.30
3. Changes to the Federal System in the Aftermath
of EU Accession
Since EU accession, a couple of minor federal constitutional
amendments have been enacted, most of them favouring the central
government, some favouring the Länder.
Amidst those that were of advantage to central government,
one ought to mention the continued process of centralising powers.
In 2002, a new Article 14b was inserted into the B-VG that redistribu-
27. BGBl 1992/276.
28. See the reports delivered in Bundeskanzerlamt (ed.), Neuordnung der Kompetenzver-
teilung in Österreich, Vienna.
29. See P. Pernthaler/G. Schernthanner, "Bundesstaatsreform 1994", in: A. Khol et alii (eds.),
Österreichisches Jahrbuch für Politik 1994, Geschichte und Politik, R. Oldenbourg, Vien-
na/Munich, 1995, 559 ff.; T. Öhlinger, "Das Scheitern der Bundesstaatsreform", in: A. Khol
et alii (eds.), Österreichisches..., cit., 543 ff.; W. Brandtner, "Die Bundesstaatsreform aus
der Sicht der Länder", in: P. Pernthaler (ed.), Bundesstaatsreform als Instrument der
Verwaltungsreform und des europäischen Föderalismus, Braumüller, Vienna, 1997, 55 ff.
(57 ff.).
30. See, with more detail, C. Ranacher, Die Funktion des Bundes bei der Umsetzung des
EU-Rechts durch die Länder, Braumüller, Vienna, 2002.
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tes power regarding public procurement.31 Formerly, legislation and
administration of this subject-matter had been split between the fed-
eration and the Länder. According to the new provision, the federa-
tion is almost exclusively responsible for procurement legislation –
with a very minor exception that allows the Länder to enact law on
legal remedies with regard to awards of contract that fall under the
Länder administrative jurisdiction.32 As regards the administration of
public procurement, the authority is still split between the federation
and the Länder, each being responsible for the execution of procure-
ment matters within its own sphere (comprising also related enterprises,
funds, self-governing bodies etc). Centralisation of the legislative po-
wer, however, seemed inevitable, not the least on account of EU pro-
curement law that suggests homogeneous implementation.
More recently, the Länder have been deprived of another power
that was transferred to the federation: Namely, their former authority
regarding animal protection which is now enumerated by Art 11 para
1 no. 8 B-VG.33 Art 11 para 1 B-VG enumerates those matters that fall
into the federal sphere concerning legislation, and into the Länder’s
sphere concerning their execution. On the basis of the new authority,
a federal Animal Protection Act was enacted, but one doubts that it
realizes the intentions that accompanied the transfer of power, namely
that a uniform federal act would establish better standards for the
protection of animals than nine different Land acts. Although it is
true that the former Land animal protection acts stipulated different
protection standards, due perhaps also to the influence of farms and
agricultural enterprises in the respective Land, these differences also
demonstrated how competitive federalism could work: To offer a va-
riety of different legal solutions, at least some of which may be better
than a uniform minimum solution.
The maintenance of homogeneity within the federal system was
31. BGBl I 2002/99. See also R. Klaushofer, "Art 14b B-VG", ZfV 2003, 630 ff.; C. Kleiser,
"Die neue Kompetenzverteilung im Vergaberecht", ÖJZ 2003, 449 ff. and M. Holoubek,
"Das Bundesvergabegesetz 2002: Kompetenzgrundlagen – Geltungsbereich – Vergabe-
verfahren", in: Österreichische Juristenkommission (ed.), Vergaberecht 2002, NWV, Vien-
na/Graz, 2003, 18 ff.; H. P. Rill, "Art 14b B-VG", in: H. P. Rill/H. Schäffer (eds.), Bundesver-
fassungsrecht, Verlag Österreich, Vienna, 2004.
32. Art 14b para 3 B-VG.
33. BGBl I 2004/118.
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another relevant issue in the last few years. In 1999, the “principle of
homogeneity” that had applied to Land law concerning public employ-
ees of the Länder and municipalities was abolished.34 Formerly, the
respective Land laws had not been allowed to deviate fundamentally
from the respective federal law concerning federal employees, at least
not to an extent that would have made it difficult for Land or municipal
employees to move to the federal civil service. This was one of the
rather few examples where Land legislation had been bound to observe
the rules set by ordinary federal laws;35 usually, it is only bound to ob-
serve the Federal Constitution and the respective Land constitution.
Although the Länder are now free to regulate the law concerning
their own and municipal employees without these restrictions, Art 21
para 4 B-VG still requires both the federation and the Länder to inform
each other about relevant reforms in order to provide for an adequate
development of the law regulating public employees and their inter-
est groups. Moreover, public employees are still allowed to move from
one public employer (federation, Länder, municipalities, municipal
associations) to another. Finally, Art 21 para 4 B-VG prohibits laws that
would assess the terms of service differently according to the tier
where the public employee had worked.
A major step towards co-operative fiscal federalism was set in
1999, when the treaties on a so-called “consultation mechanism”36
and the “Austrian stability pact”37 were concluded. Both treaties were
34. BGBl I 1999/8. See also P. Bußjäger, "Bemerkungen zur Neuregelung der Kompetenzver-
teilung auf dem Gebiet des Dienstrechtes der öffentlich Bediensteten", JBl 1999, 773 ff.
35. Another example is Art 12 B-VG that enumerates a couple of matters where the fed-
eration is responsible for the enactment of federal framework laws, and the Länder for
the enactment of implementation laws and their execution. The difference, however, was
that the Länder laws regulating Land and municipal civil service had not only to observe
federal framework laws, but detailed federal laws that regulated the federal civil service.
36. Vereinbarung zwischen dem Bund, den Ländern und den Gemeinden über einen Kon-
sultationsmechanismus und einen künftigen Stabilitätspakt der Gebietskörperschaften
(see, e.g., BGBl I 1999/35). See also J. Weiss, "Der Konsultationsmechanismus als Instru-
ment zur Reduzierung der Folgekosten gesetzgeberischer Maßnahmen", JRP 1997, 153
ff.; P. Bußjäger, "Rechtsfragen zum Konsultationsmechanismus", ÖJZ 2000, 581 ff.; K. We-
ber, "BVG Gemeindebund", in: K. Korinek/M. Holoubek (eds.), Österreichisches Bundes-
verfassungsrecht, Springer, Vienna/New York, 2000; H. Schäffer, "Konsultationsmechanis-
mus und innerstaatlicher Stabilitätspakt", ZÖR 56 (2001), 145 ff.; P. Oberndorfer/B. Leitl,
"Die Kostentragungsregeln nach Art 4 Konsultationsmechanismus im System der Finanz-
verfassung", FS Adamovich, Verlag Österreich, Vienna, 2002, 553 ff.
37. Vereinbarung zwischen dem Bund, den Ländern und den Gemeinden betreffend die
Koordination der Haushaltsführung von Bund, Ländern und Gemeinden (Österreichischer
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concluded under Art 15a B-VG between the federation and the Länder,
but, exceptionally, also by the representative associations of the Aus-
trian municipalities on behalf of the municipalities. Art 15a B-VG itself
entitles only the federation and the Länder to conclude vertical and
horizontal treaties with each other, but excludes the municipalities
from these treaties. This is due to the classical concept of federalism
that considers local government as a non-constituent unit of the fed-
eral system.38 Only in exceptional cases, therefore, are municipalities
allowed to join the federation and the Länder as a third partner – pri-
marily, this concerns fiscal relations where the Austrian municipalities
are traditionally represented in the political negotiations preceding
the enactment of the Financial Equalisation Act. In order to entitle
them to conclude the two treaties with the federation and the Länder,
a Federal Constitutional Act of Authorisation was enacted that allowed
the Austrian Association of Municipalities and the Austrian Associa-
tion of Towns to conclude the treaties on behalf of the municipalities.39
On this basis, the treaty on a “consultation mechanism” was concluded
in 1999, whilst the treaty on an “Austrian stability pact”, has meanwhile
been re-enacted as the Austrian Stability Pact 2005.
The consultation mechanism provides that if the federation or
a Land intends to enact a law or regulation that would have a finan-
cial impact on another territorial unit (except certain acts, such as the
Financial Equalisation Act), the other partners may comment on the
planned act within certain periods, and a consultation committee,
where the federation as well as the Länder and municipalities are re-
presented equally, may consider the issue and seek to find a solution.
Stabilitätspakt, BGBl I 1999/101). See also E. Primosch, Stabilitätspakt, Verlag Österreich,
Vienna, 2000; A. Gamper, "Der Stabilitätspakt 2001 im Spannungsfeld von Budgetkonsoli-
dierung und Finanzausgleichsgerechtigkeit", JRP 2002, 240 ff.
38. See, however, K. Weber, "Zwei- oder dreigliedriger Bundesstaat? Bemerkungen zur
Stellung der Gemeinden in einer möglichen künftigen Bundesverfassung", FS Pernthaler,
Springer, Vienna/New York, 2005, 413 ff.
39. These two associations are associations under private law, but mentioned also in Art
115 para 3 B-VG according to which the two associations represent the interests of all
municipalities. In principle, there is just one type of Austrian municipality, irrespective of
its size or number of inhabitants (“principle of the abstract and uniform municipality”),
although there are some differences mainly concerning the position of Vienna and that
of towns with their own statutes. Politically, however, the Austrian Association of Towns
rather represents the interests of towns and larger municipalities, whereas the Austrian
Association of Municipalities represents the interests of smaller municipalities.
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If the committee fails to effect such a solution, the federation or Land
that wants to enact the respective law or ordinance will have to bear
the additional financial burden. In practice, the consultation mecha-
nism improves mutual transparency as regards the expenses arising
from planned legal measures, although the formal procedure is rarely
applied. In some cases, statements are delivered too late, whereas in
other cases informal negotiation may lead to the withdrawal of nega-
tive comments.
The Austrian Stability Pact 2001 and 2005, however, treats the
three tiers much less equally. Whilst a deficit is to a certain extent
allowed to the federation, the Länder have to achieve a budgetary
surplus and the municipalities at least a balanced budget. If they do
not meet these standards, a mediation committee that consists of
equal numbers of representatives of all tiers will decide whether the
defaulting partner will have to pay certain damages. The Stability Pact
thus seeks to co-ordinate the budgets of the three territorial tiers, to
make them more transparent and more predictable. Indeed, all EU
member states that are federal systems need to harmonize their bud-
gets internally so that the EU convergence criteria may be met. The
Austrian Stability Pact, however, clearly discriminates against the Län-
der to the advantage of the federation and is in truth no co-operative
instrument although this was suggested by a concordat under Art 15a
B-VG. It is thus not surprising that the Länder did not volunteer to
sign the treaty. Rather, they were forced to do so, since the Financial
Equalisation Act 2005 provides that revenues of the Länder that they
normally receive from shared federal taxes under the Financial Equa-
lisation Act would be shortened to an extent identical with those
amounts that they would have to achieve as a surplus under the con-
cordat unless they ratified the Stability Pact.40 Co-operation is thus
perverted into coercion, allowing the Länder to choose between either
the loss of revenues or the narrowing of their budgets. Their influen-
ce on the determination of the respective provision during the nego-
tiations preceding the Financial Equalisation Act was very little, since
the federation has a notorious reputation for dominating the other
partners in the negotiations so that even the informal agreement that
is signed afterwards, even though it may express the general consent
of all partners to the purpose that the federation should follow the
40. See § 25 para 6 Finanzausgleichsgesetz 2005.
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negotiations when enacting the Financial Equalisation Act, results un-
der some political constraint. If, however, the agreement on a new
Financial Equalisation Act is reached and signed (usually, every four
years a new act is negotiated), the Constitutional Court will restrict
its review of this law, assuming that no partner may feel seriously
discriminated by a law that was agreed by all partners.41 This means
that the Länder would probably not succeed to challenge the respec-
tive provision of the Financial Equalisation Act before the Constitu-
tional Court on grounds of discrimination and breach of the alloca-
tion of powers, since the Court would be disinclined to examine the
law as thoroughly as would be the case had the Länder not them-
selves signed the financial equalisation agreement.
As regards the Constitutional Court’s more recent adjudication
concerning Austrian federalism, the “homogeneity” cases must be
mentioned in the first place. In 1993, the Constitutional Court had
repealed a provision of the Tyrolean Local Government Election Act
that had provided for the direct election of mayors, due to lacking
explicit provisions in the Federal Constitution.42 The Court, however,
held that the democratic principle on which the Federal Constitution
was founded demanded a system of representative democracy with
only minor direct democratic exceptions. Even though the Federal
Constitution did not explicitly regulate the election of mayors, it was
to be derived from the abstract constitutional principle of democracy
that mayors should not be elected directly by the local citizens entit-
led to vote, but by the local council. Although the repealed provision
had the rank of an ordinary Land law and not a Land constitutional
law, one may assume that even a Land constitutional provision would
have been in breach of the constitutional principle of (representative)
democracy according to the Court’s opinion. Thus, one could argue
that also the constitutional autonomy of the Länder which is deemed
to be a fundamental element of the principle of federalism would
have been interpreted restrictively. Only after a federal constitutional
amendment43 had explicitly allowed Land constitutions to provide
for the direct election of mayors, did the Constitutional Court decide
that this exception to the predominant system of direct democracy
41. See, e.g., VfSlg 12.500/1990; 12.784/1991; 16.457/2002.
42. VfSlg 13.500/1993.
43. BGBl 1994/504. See Art 117 para 6 B-VG.
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was constitutional. In other words, the mere silence of the Federal
Constitution – that normally indicates to the Länder their right to
create their own constitutional rules instead – was not deemed a
sufficient basis for the direct election of mayors, since the lack of ex-
plicit federal constitutional rules did not prevent the application of
implicit constitutional principles, even though this might reduce the
scope of Land constitutional autonomy and thus also belittle the
principle of federalism, whereas the explicit federal constitutional
authorisation obviously entitled the Land constitutions to provide a
system of direct mayoral elections without violation of the principle
of democracy.
This view is maintained by a more recent judgment44 in which
the Constitutional Court repealed a provision of the Constitution of
the Land Vorarlberg that had obliged the Land parliament to adopt
laws if these were demanded by a citizens’ initiative and confirmed
by a referendum. Again, the Court held this to be a violation of the
constitutional principle of representative democracy although the
Federal Constitution did not contain any explicit provision regarding
direct democracy in the Länder. Instead, the Federal Constitution ex-
plicitly establishes the Land parliaments as the general representative
bodies of the Land citizens45 and explicitly provides direct democratic
elements at the federal level, though not in the same way as the Vor-
arlberg Constitution did. The constitutional autonomy of the Länder,
which is their supreme legislative power and which therefore clearly
belongs to the essential elements of Austrian federalism,46 was thus
44. VfSlg 16.241/2001. See also U. Willi, Die Bundesverfassungskonformität der Vorarlber-
ger “Volksgesetzgebung”, Braumüller, Vienna, 2005; P. Pernthaler, "Demokratische Identität
oder bundesstaatliche Homogenität der Demokratiesysteme in Bund und Ländern", JBl
2000, 808 ff.; T. Öhlinger, “Bundesverfassungsgesetzliche Grenzen der Volksgesetzgebung”,
Montfort 2000, 402 ff.; A. Gamper, "Direkte Demokratie und bundesstaatliches Homoge-
nitätsprinzip", ÖJZ 2003, 441 ff.; A. Gamper, "Homogeneity and Democracy in Austrian
Federalism: The Constitutional Court’s Ruling on Direct Democracy in Vorarlberg", Publius
– The Journal of Federalism 33 (2003), 45 ff.; J. Marko, "Direkte Demokratie zwischen Par-
lamentarismus und Verfassungsautonomie", FS Mantl, Böhlau, Vienna et alii, 2004, 335
ff.; P. Bußjäger, "Plebiszitäre Demokratie im Mehrebenensystem? Zur Theorie direkter De-
mokratie in föderalen und konföderalen Systemen", FS Pernthaler, Springer, Vienna/New
York, 2005, 85 ff.
45. Art 95 B-VG.
46. See F. Koja, Das Verfassungsrecht der österreichischen Bundesländer2, Springer, Vien-
na/New York, 1988; R. Novak, "Bundes-Verfassungsgesetz und Landesverfassungsrecht",
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restricted in favour of the principle of representative democracy. Al-
though the Constitutional Court did not expressly state that the prin-
ciple of representative democracy was superior to the principle of fed-
eralism, its views regarding the irrelevance of direct democracy at the
federal level – which can be doubted with good reasons –47 and the
overwhelming importance that is given to implied standards of
democratic homogeneity encountered some academic resistance.48
This case is surely one of those, particularly in recent times, where the
Court showed a highly centralistic attitude. The question whether
other implied criteria of homogeneity might be found in other cases
in the future, perhaps also under other constitutional principles than
democracy, gives rise to some scepticism. Jurisdiction of that kind is
methodically almost unpredictable and rather tends to disavow the
idea of the constitutional autonomy of the Länder – which is more
than merely “secondary” (or implementing) constitutional legislation
– even though this very idea was co-developed by the Constitutional
Court over the last decades.49
in: H. Schambeck (ed.), Das österreichische Bundes-Verfassungsgesetz und seine Entwick-
lung, Duncker & Humblot, Berlin, 1980, 111 ff.; R. Novak, "Die relative Verfassungsautono-
mie der Länder", in: R. Rack (ed.), Landesverfassungsreform, Böhlau, Vienna et alii, 1982,
35 ff.; R. Novak, "Landesgesetzgebung und Verfassungsrecht", in: H. Schambeck (ed.), Fö-
deralismus und Parlamentarismus in Österreich, Österreichische Staatsdruckerei, Vienna,
1992, 53 ff.; R. Novak, "Art 99 B-VG", in: K. Korinek/M. Holoubek (eds.), Österreichisches
Bundesverfassungsrecht, Springer, Vienna/New York, 1999; P. Pernthaler, "Die Verfassungs-
autonomie der österreichischen Bundesländer", JBl 1986, 477 ff.; P. Pernthaler, Österreich-
isches Bundesstaatsrecht, cit.; W. Pesendorfer, "Art 99 B-VG", in: H. P. Rill/H. Schäffer (eds.),
Bundesverfassungsrecht, Verlag Österreich, Vienna, 2002.
47. Art 44 para 3 B-VG that requires a referendum in case of a “total revision” of the Fe-
deral Constitution is unanimously agreed to be a norm the serious amendment or abolition
of which would constitute a “total revision”. A provision that essentially involves the citi-
zens when it comes to the ultimate decision on the Federal Constitution’s continuity surely
cannot be numbered among other “marginal” elements of direct democracy.
48. See, e.g., P. Pernthaler, "Demokratische Identität...", cit., 808 ff.; P. Pernthaler, Österrei-
chisches Bundesstaatsrecht, cit., 464; T. Öhlinger, Bundesverfassungsgesetzliche Grenzen...,
cit., 402 ff.; R. Novak, "Demokratisches Prinzip und Verfassungswandel", FS Mantl, Böhlau,
Vienna et al, 2004, 117 ff. (124 f.); A. Gamper, "Direkte Demokratie...", cit., 441 ff.; H. P.
Rill / H. Schäffer, "Art 1 B-VG", in: H. P. Rill / H. Schäffer (eds.), Bundesverfassungsrecht...,
cit., Rz 29; P. Bußjäger, "Plebiszitäre Demokratie...", cit., 107 ff.
49. Beginning with VfSlg 6783/1972, following the impetus given by F. Koja, "Das Verfassungs-
recht... ", cit., 17 ff., 23. See, for a summary, R. Novak, "Art 99 B-VG", cit., Rz 13 ff.
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In 2004, the Constitutional Court reinforced the case-law on
homogeneity by another decision50 that repealed provisions of the
(ordinary) Vienna Local Government Elections Act that had admitted
non-Austrian (and non-EU) nationals to take part in the Viennese
district elections after being resident for 5 years. Again, it would have
made no difference if the repealed provisions had been enacted as
Land constitutional laws since the Court applied the principle of demo-
cracy as an overall standard of homogeneity. The district councils were
seen as general representative bodies (such as, e.g., the parliaments
or local councils) the election of which is reserved to Austrian citizens.
The Court concluded that the right of non-Austrian nationals to elect
general representative bodies such as the district councils was not
compatible with the principle of homogeneous elections that ema-
nated from the principle of representative democracy, although the
Federal Constitution did not at all explicitly regulate the district coun-
cils or their elections.
In all cases, the Constitutional Court restricted the principle of
federalism according to a wide understanding of homogeneous re-
presentative democracy. Moreover, the Court increasingly develops
standards of implied homogeneity which is per se a methodical problem
and does not only expose the principle of federalism and its consti-
tuent elements to a highly unpredictable style of interpretation.
Quite recently, another judgment has been of some relevance
to the Austrian federal system.51 The Constitutional Court dismissed
the application of the Land government of Salzburg to repeal certain
federal constitutional provisions. The Land government argued that
these provisions that regulated the administration and maintenance
of the federal forests by a private company whilst the federation re-
mained the “owner” of the forests endangered the position of the
Land. In the aftermath of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy that was
followed by the new Republic, however, section 11 of the Transitory
Constitutional Law of 1920 had, apart from more specific provisions,
reserved the “ultimate apportionment” of assets of the federation
50. VfSlg 17.264/2004. See also P. Pernthaler, "Volk, Demokratie und Menschenrechte in
den Wiener Gemeindebezirken", JBl 2005, 195 ff.
51. VfSlg 16.587/2002. See also M. Holoubek/M. Lang, "Bundesforste und Vermögensauf-
teilung im Bundesstaat", ZfV 2001, 738 ff.
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and the Länder to the enactment of a future federal constitutional
law (that hitherto has not been enacted). Since the new provisions
that regulated the relationship between the forest company and the
federation had the rank of a federal constitutional law and since they
defined the federation as the “owner”, the Länder were afraid that
this implied “ultimate apportionment” of the forests with the federation
as future owner of the Austrian forests and that this would violate
the principle of federalism. The Constitutional Court, however, held
that the challenged provisions did not refer to the federation as an
“external owner”, but only in its relationship to the private forest
company that should just be responsible for maintaining the forests
without owning them. Without undertaking “ultimate apportionment”,
the provisions rather sought to maintain the substance of the forests
– also to the advantage of the Länder should “ultimate apportion-
ment” actually be realized in the future. This implies, at least, that
the Constitutional Court recognizes that the Länder have not as yet
lost all their assets, but that this remains to be solved in the future.
4. The Austrian Constitutional Convention
4.1. General Remarks
Clearly, a basic reform of Austrian federalism has not been realiz-
ed yet. Step-by-step reform as undertaken in the last years has only
dealt with selected aspects of the federal system, and not always to
the advantage of the Länder. The crucial reform issues, however, re-
main unsolved: This primarily concerns the allocation of powers which
is strongly criticised in various aspects and from different political
viewpoints: Too centralistic, too fragmented, too little in accordance
with the principle of subsidiarity, inflexible, unsuited to the implemen-
tation of EU law and the homogeneous normative treatment of cer-
tain coherent matters. The focus of reform is also set on the Federal
Council since its powers are very limited and since it does not repres-
ent the political interests of the Länder properly. Whereas some de-
mand the abolition of the Federal Council, others argue for streng-
thening the legal influence that the Länder have on the Federal Coun-
cil. However, the future of the Federal Council’s functions seems to
depend on the future allocation of powers: An option, for example,
is to curtail Länder powers, but to entitle the Federal Council to an
absolute veto regarding those federal laws that would be based on
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a new federal power instead of a former Land power. Clearly, moreo-
ver, financial equalisation is inseparably connected to a general reform
of the allocation of powers. This, in its turn, concerns the issue of co-
operative federalism where the municipal representations claim a
status of more parity with the federation and the Länder.
Facing not only the deficiencies of the federal system, but also
the deficiencies, fragmentation and lack of clarity of Austrian federal
constitutional law in general, a Constitutional Convention was set up
on 2 May 2003.52 The Constitutional Convention consisted of 70 experts
and functionaries – politicians, representatives of all territorial units,
lobbyists, and constitutional lawyers – and was headed by the Former
President of the Federal Court of Auditors. According to its mandate,
the Convention’s task was to discuss a reform of the Federal Constitution
under various aspects and to draft a new constitution which, however,
would have to observe the limits set by the principles of the recent
Constitution (republicanism, democracy, rule of law, federalism, human
rights, separation of powers). Thus, from the very beginning, it was
clear that the enactment of a new constitution should not require a
total revision under Art 44 para 3 B-VG, which meant that also the
principle of federalism should not be abolished or amended seriously.
The Convention consisted of ten committees that had to deal
with single reform issues more specifically and profoundly. The reform
of the federal system as one of the most crucial issues was dealt with
by most committees to a larger or smaller extent. Committee no. 3
“State Institutions”, for instance, discussed possible reform options
concerning the Federal Council, the institutions of the Länder (Land
parliaments, Land executives), the constitutional autonomy of the
52. For further information, including the Convention’s final report and an exhaustive list
of literature, see www.konvent.gv.at. See, most lately and comprehensively, Österrei-
chische Juristenkommission (ed.), Der Österreich-Konvent: Zwischenbilanz und Perspektiven,
Vienna/Graz, NWV, 2004.; W. Berka et alii (eds.), Verfassungsreform, Vienna/Graz, NWV,
2004; P. Bußjäger/D. Larch (eds.), Die Neugestaltung des föderalen Systems vor dem Hinter-
grund des Österreich-Konvents, Institut für Föderalismus, Innsbruck, 2004; P. Bußjäger/R.
Hrbek (eds.), Projekte der Föderalismusreform – Österreich-Konvent und Föderalismuskom-
mission im Vergleich, Braumüller, Vienna, 2005; P. Bußjäger, "Klippen einer Föderalismus-
reform – Die Inszenierung Österreich-Konvent zwischen Innovationsresistenz und Neo-
josephinismus", in: Europäisches Zentrum für Föderalismus-Forschung Tübingen (ed.), Jahr-
buch des Föderalismus 2005, Nomos, Baden-Baden, 2005, 403 ff.; T. Olechowski (ed.), Der
Wert der Verfassung – Werte in der Verfassung, Manz, Vienna, 2005.
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Länder and new forms of co-operation between the federation and
the Länder. Committee no. 5 “Allocation of Powers between the Fed-
eration, the Länder and the Municipalities” strove to find solutions
for a new distribution of powers. Committee no. 6 “Administrative
Reform” also dealt with the co-ordination of the federal and Land
administrations, with new forms of administration and with the futu-
re of the system of indirect federal administration. Among other tasks,
Committee no. 8 “Democratic Forms of Control” treated the question
of direct democracy at federal, Land and municipal level. Committee
no. 9 “Legal protection, the Courts” discussed the influence of the
Länder on the courts and, particularly, the future establishment of
administrative courts of the Länder. Finally, Committee no. 10 “Finan-
cial Constitution” was concerned with a reform of the financial consti-
tution and the system of financial equalisation as well as the agreements
on a consultation mechanism and the stability pact. Very different
suggestions were made by the political parties, the representatives of
the federation, Länder, municipalities, social and economic interest
groups and constitutional experts, with even cross-cutting cleavages
such as between the left-wing parties (Social Democrats, Greens) and
the Austrian Federal Economic Chamber that both advocated a more
centralistic allocation of powers.
It is not surprising, therefore, that the Constitutional Convention
failed to effect a broad political compromise at the end of its term
(January 2005). Neither did it present a draft for a new Federal Cons-
titution, even though the chairman submitted a private draft in January
2005, which, however, was not accepted. Instead, the Convention
presented a highly comprehensive Final Report53 that, following some
general remarks, consists of the individual final reports of the ten
committees and of certain drafts and statements submitted by indi-
viduals or groups that, however, were not accepted by the Conven-
tion as a whole. The final reports are a collection of documents that
reflect the discussions within the committees, which, in most cases,
rather present a variety of different opinions than general consensus.
On the basis of these reports, however, a new initiative was set
to revive the reform project. The Federal Chancellor submitted the
53. 1/ENDB-K of 31 January 2005.
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Convention’s Final Report to the National Council that established a
select committee “concerned with the pre-deliberation of the Conven-
tion’s report” on 31 March 2005. The select committee commenced
its work on 5 July 2005 and is expected to deal with all crucial reform
issues in its sessions until summer 2006. It seems unlikely, however,
that the long-expected reform of the federal system will now be re-
alised in such relatively short time. The political attitudes towards re-
form differ largely, but the government will need the support of the
opposition in order to get a constitutional amendment through par-
liament which is the more improbable since the next elections of the
National Council will take place in autumn 2006.
Since the discussion on a reform of the federal system is thus
going to continue, the committee reports that were submitted under
the auspices of the Constitutional Convention will at least offer a
framework of possible solutions. It is therefore worth tracing the res-
pective debates, analyzing the different reform options and elabora-
ting their possible outcome from a constitutional perspective. In the
following, this will involve the allocation of powers, reform of the
Federal Council, financial equalisation and the establishment of admin-
istrative courts in the Länder.
4.2. The Allocation of Powers
The future allocation of powers54 probably constitutes the key
reform issue, being closely connected to all other issues tangent to
the reform of Austrian federalism, and it is not surprising that the
opinions presented by the members of Committee no. 5 were highly
controversial.
Consensus went as far as to suggest a reduction of the number
of types of competences, to incorporate the presently scattered allo-
cation of powers into the new Federal Constitution, to simplify the
system, to make it more flexible as well as to consider the impact of
EU law-making. However, the committee members could neither agree
as to the method of realizing these aims nor to the more substantive
details.
54. See 1/ENDB-K of 31 January 2005, part 3, page 110 ff.
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Generally, the discussion put focus on two possible models of
attributing powers – namely, a “two-column model” and a “three-
column model”. Whilst a “two-column model” would provide exclusive
fields of authority for the federation on the one hand and for the
Länder on the other, a “three-column model” would add a third field
of “shared/joint authority”. Presently, the federation and the Länder
are both vested with exclusive powers and, to a minor extent, shared/
joint powers (e.g. federal framework legislation – Länder implemen-
ting legislation,55 federal legislation according to “necessity of unifor-
mity”).56 Moreover, the Länder execute federal laws in a number of
fields autonomously, whilst the system of indirect federal administra-
tion, even though the subject-matter remains federal, allows them to
execute federal matters at least on behalf of the federation. A “three-
column model” would thus not be utterly new to the Austrian federal
system. In principle, it was supported by the Committee since it would
allow more flexibility than the more rigid “two-column model” and
would be particularly useful for the implementation of EU law.
However, whereas some members expected that an extension
of shared/joint matters would confer more powers on the Länder,
others argued that they should only exercise these powers if the fed-
eration did not so that it was uncertain whether they would profit
from an extensive “third column”. Moreover, too much flexibility
would probably slow down the legislative process and make the ac-
tual exercise of power unpredictable.
As regards shared/joint legislative authority, opinions very much
differed as to who should control the exercise of these powers – the
federation, the Federal Council or the Länder themselves – or whether
the exercise should rather depend on objective criteria (e.g. equiva-
lent living conditions, legal and economic unity, principle of subsidiar-
ity). It was suggested that, if the federation claimed a competence
due to these criteria, the Länder should be involved in the federal le-
gislative process via the Federal Council and that, if mediation bet-
ween their interests and those of the federation failed, they could sue
before the Constitutional Court in order to oblige the federation to
55. Art 12 B-VG.
56. In particular, Art 11 para 2 B-VG.
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adhere to the objective criteria (either as pre- or post-enactment scru-
tiny). Most members, however, argued that the actual exercise of pow-
ers should not be determined by rigid objective criteria, but rather by
a political process. Another idea was to split the “third column” into
two different fields, namely Länder powers that should be exercised
by the federation with the consent of the Länder and Länder powers
that should be assigned to the federation if the Federal Council deem-
ed this to be necessary. As an alternative, it was suggested that a Land
power should only be transformed into a federal power if both the
Federal Council and the Länder agreed (or unless a certain number of
Länder disagreed). This model was criticised as being too Länder-
friendly, since the Länder would then be able to frustate a federal
power even though the Federal Council might not. Nor was the sug-
gestion to entitle the Federal Council to enact “uniform Land laws”
supported, since uniform law-making, if at all required, should result
in a federal law and not in “uniform” law-making of the Länder that
in truth would not leave to them any individual law-making within
the “third column”.
If a “three-column” model would at all be realized, the committee
members agreed that the federation should be allowed to restrict its
law-making to framework legislation “voluntarily”.
Another task of the committee was to reduce the highly frag-
mented list of enumerated subject-matters and to create a list of 50
– 60 “subject fields” instead. There was some consensus that the fol-
lowing fields should belong to the federation: Federal constitution,
foreign affairs, defence, federal finances, financial equalisation, money
and capital, economic steering and common issues of agricultural po-
licy, internal security, federal employees, organisation of the federa-
tion, federal statistics, data protection, nationality, registration and
immigration issues, civil law and civil law jurisdiction, traffic, labour
law, competition and trust law, social insurance, media and information
transfer, churches and religious communities, cultural institutions of
the federation, standardization and adjustment measures, adminis-
trative procedural law, general provisions of the law on administra-
tive offences and procedural law before the Administrative Court. The
Länder, in their turn, should be responsible for their own constitu-
tions, organisation and finances, Land employees, organisation of the
municipalities and municipal employees, Land statistics, events, local
safety, emergency aid, fire brigades, rescue issues, building law, regional
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and local health services and sepulture, nurseries, day care centres and
kindergarten, roads and public lanes (with the exception of federal
roads), housing and housing subsidies, nature and landscape protection,
sport, tourism, cultural affairs, spatial law and soil protection. It was
moreover suggested that the federation should be allowed to delegate
its law-making powers to the Länder in all of its fields57 and that the
Länder should be allowed to enact their own civil law,58 if required
for the exercise of their competences, as well as specific company law
for their own privatised entities.
However, the future allocation of powers was particularly con-
troversial regarding the following issues: Public procurement, electro-
nic government, the administrative officials’ duty to give information,
schools, health, economy, professional associations, facility sites, envi-
ronmental law, water, forestry, mountain law, waste disposal, energy,
animal and plants protection, agriculture, labour law pertaining to
employees in the fields of agriculture and forestry, cultural assets and
external affairs of the Länder, social welfare, youth protection and
adult education. Despite a plethora of suggestions made by the com-
mittee’s constitutional experts and political representatives, no com-
promise could be effected as to whether these “competence fields”
should rather belong to the exclusive powers of the federation or the
Länder or be split between them or rather belong to a possible “third
column”.
Clearly, a reduction of the long list of detailed subject-matters
and their transformation into large “competence fields” would require
a guideline to allow the attribution of former matters to a new “com-
petence field”. It remained unsolved whether this should be done by
a more or less flexible Competence Transformation Act, by an agree-
ment between the federation and the Länder or rather left in more
detail to the explanatory notes that would accompany the new Fed-
eral Constitution. Another question related to this issue concerns the
interpretation of powers. It is true that the system that presently un-
57. Presently, the possibility to enact “delegated legislation” is restricted to certain fields,
such as e.g. mountain, forestry and water law, according to Art 10 para 2 B-VG.
58. Presently, the Länder may, within their fields of legislative competences, enact civil and
criminal law (which are both federal subject-matters) as far as this is essentially required
for the exercise of their own competences (Art 15 para 9 B-VG).
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derlies the allocation of powers is only responsible for part of the
problem, but that the problem is also due to the Constitutional Court’s
method of interpreting powers – mainly, according to the “petrifica-
tion theory” which is a specific form of an objective-historic interpre-
tation method.59 Larger “competence fields” should effect more clarity
in this regard, and on the whole interpretation should have a more
coherent and contextual basis, although this should not exclude the
application of a historic method. Most committee members agreed
that the interpretation methods should not be formally embodied in
the Federal Constitution, but that they should be defined in the ex-
planatory notes.
A particular problem emerges from the obligation to implement
EU directives. The present allocation of powers frequently demands
implementation both by the federation and the Länder – each accord-
ing to its own sphere of authority. “Complex” matters that are regu-
lated by an EU directive may affect a variety of legal aspects and the-
refore a variety of issues that, under the highly fragmented Austrian
system, may fall under different powers of both tiers which slows
down the process of implementation. Co-operation is needed between
the federation and the Länder, and particularly the Länder may suffer
from lack of information or the federation’s delays in informing them
in time. The committee held, however, that the general principle –
implementation of EU directives according to the internal allocation
of powers – should be maintained and that the federation should not
be vested with an overall implementation authority. The present pro-
vision entitles the federation to implement a directive when the Län-
der default the date set for their implementation if this is recognized
by one of the European Courts.60 Whilst some suggested that the fed-
59. See also P. Pernthaler, Kompetenzverteilung in der Krise, Braumüller, Vienna, 1989, 79
ff.; P. Pernthaler, Österreichisches Bundesstaatsrecht, cit., 332 ff.; B.-C. Funk, Das System
der bundesstaatlichen Kompetenzverteilung im Lichte der Verfassungsrechtsprechung,
Braumüller, Vienna, 1980, 69 ff.; B.-C. Funk, "Reform der Gesetzgebungskompetenzen im
Bundesstaat", FS Pernthaler, Springer, Vienna/New York, 2005, 127 ff.; H. Schäffer, Verfassungs-
interpretation in Österreich, Springer, Vienna/New York, 1971, 97 ff.; G. Thurner, Der Bun-
desstaat in der neueren Rechtsprechung des Verfassungsgerichtshofes unter besonderer
Berücksichtigung der Kompetenzverteilung, Braumüller, Vienna/New York, 1994, 24 ff.;
E. Wiederin, "Anmerkungen zur Versteinerungstheorie", FS Winkler, Springer, Vienna,
1997, 1231 ff.; E. Wiederin, Bundesrecht und Landesrecht, Springer, Vienna/New York,
1995, 179 ff.; C. Grabenwarter, "Verfassungsinterpretation, Verfassungswandel und
Rechtsfortbildung", FS Mantl, Böhlau, Vienna et alii, 2004, 35 ff., (45 ff.).
60. Art 23d para 5 B-VG.
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eration should become responsible automatically after the expiry of
the implementation term, others argued that there might be cases of
doubt if a directive was implemented properly and that the federation
should not be allowed to prejudice such a scenario.
4.3. The Federal Council
The members of Committee no. 361 agreed that a reform of the
Federal Council would be particularly indispensable, but that the Län-
der should continue to participate in the federal law-making proce-
dure via the Federal Council. This is, of course, due to the necessity to
represent the Länder within the process of federal law-making, since
the direct consent of the Länder is typically required only in a minor
number of cases.62
The Committee was aware that only part of the Federal Coun-
cil’s recent failure was due to the Federal Constitution, but that the
lack of strong legal powers was accompanied by a traditional dislike
of exercising those powers that exist in order to protect Länder inter-
ests.63 According to the predominant opinion, the Federal Council
should be integrated into the federal law-making procedure at an
earlier stage. One option could be to table a bill before the National
Council and the Federal Council simultaneously or to allow the Fed-
eral Council’s delegates to participate in committee meetings of the
National Council. As regards the Federal Council’s functions, the sug-
gestions were particularly controversial: Clearly, the recent situation
where the Federal Council is mainly entitled to a suspensive veto that
may be overruled by another decision of the National Council (with
a qualified quorum) does not satisfy the Länder. However, neither did
the idea to transform the suspensive into an absolute veto find much
61. See 1/ENDB-K of 31 January 2005, part 3, page 63 ff.
62. See Art 14b para 4, Art 102 para 1, Art 129a para 2 B-VG.
63. Since autumn 2005, when parliamentary elections took place in several Länder, follow-
ed by new elections of delegates to the Federal Council, the Social Democrats and Greens
have commanded a slight majority in the Federal Council and already exerted the Federal
Council’s suspensive veto in a number of cases. However, this is obviously not done in order
to defend the Länder from the impact of bills passed by the National Council, but in order
to oppose bills that were initiated by the Conservative government.
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support, nor the proposal to allow the Federal Council to co-ordinate
the legislation of the Länder. Committee members agreed that the
Federal Council should keep its absolute veto in case of constitutio-
nal amendments that curtailed Länder powers or amended the pro-
visions concerning the Federal Council’s composition, which could in
both cases be accompanied by a double majority.64 Some members
suggested an additional absolute veto against all kinds of constitutio-
nal amendments, whilst others – instead of applying the consultation
mechanism – proposed an absolute veto against all federal laws to
execute which would impose serious financial burdens on the Länder.
Another controversial issue was the kind of veto that should be given
to the Federal Council with regard to “third column” matters. An
absolute veto could compensate the Länder for an eventual loss of
power, but might also disavow the very rationale of the “third column”,
namely competence flexibility.
Another controversial suggestion was to entitle the Federal
Council to a “partial veto”, namely to veto only part of a bill instead
of the whole bill, which is not possible under the present Federal
Constitution, and to appoint the Federal Council as the body gener-
ally responsible to represent the Länder in all procedures where, so
far, the Länder have participated directly.
As regards the future organisation of the Federal Council, pro-
posals were made either to elect not only persons that are eligible to
the Land parliaments, but rather members of the Land parliaments
themselves that could be bound by the parliaments’ instructions (loss
of “free mandate”), to include the Land governors and other members
of the Land governments, to elect delegates on an adhoc-basis, to
provide for the direct election of delegates by the Länd citizens or to
leave it to the Land constitutions to provide their own selection
methods. Neither could unanimity be reached regarding these sugges-
tions nor regarding the idea to transform the Federal Council into a
representative body of both the Länder and the municipalities which
would constitute a big step towards the creation of a tri-level federal
system. Another question was whether the asymmetric composition
64. Namely, this would require the agreement of delegates representing a majority of Län-
der and the agreement of the majority of delegates as a whole.
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of delegates – different numbers according to the population figures
of the Länder – should be made more symmetric, which is also touch-
ing on theoretical controversy,65 but a majority argued for the main-
tenance of the asymmetric system of representation (no “Senate
model”).
Apart from the future role of the Federal Council, Committee
no. 566 discussed Länder participation in federal law-making in general.
The new Federal Constitution should contain a mutual duty of the
federation and the Länder respectively to inform each other of new
legislative projects. This could go hand in hand with a constitutional
embodiment of the present consultation mechanism, although the
consultation mechanism should not obstruct the law-making proce-
dure. If the Federal Council should be involved in the federal law-
making process at an earlier stage – which was generally supported
–, this would not need a federal constitutional law, but could be
regulated by the Standing Orders. Most committee members held that
the present system of submitting Land bills to the federal government
was dispensable. However, the consent of the government should
remain necessary if the Land bill stipulated the assistance of federal
executive bodies for its execution.
Finally, no consensus could be reached as to the future legal
nature of agreements under Art 15a B-VG. Whilst some committee
members suggested direct applicability of these agreements so that
no transformation should be necessary, the majority dismissed the
idea of direct applicability and held that parliaments should remain
responsible for implementing the agreements if legislative powers
were affected. As regards international treaties between the Länder
and neighbouring states or their constituent units – which are not
concluded in practice – committee members agreed that the treaty-
making power of the Länder should be extended in as far as they
should be able to conclude treaties with all states or their constituent
units worldwide and as they should not depend on the Federal Presi-
dent to initiate treaty negotiations and to conclude treaties, but that
65. A. Gamper, "«Arithmetische» und «geometrische» Gleichheit im Bundesstaat", FS Pern-
thaler, Springer, Vienna/New York, 2005, 143 ff.; M. Pleyer, Föderative Gleichheit, Duncker
& Humblot, Berlin, 2005.
66. See 1/ENDB-K of 31 January 2005, part 3, page 129 ff.
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the conclusion of Länder treaties should remain under the supervising
authority of the federation.
4.4. Fiscal Federalism
Committee no. 1067 dealt with a variety of issues related to the
financial constitution and financial equalisation. No consensus was
reached regarding the crucial questions, namely the parity of the
federation, Länder and municipalities within the system of financial
equalisation, the authority to enact the Financial Equalisation Act, the
“principle of connectivity” and the future of the consultation mecha-
nism and stability pact.
Whereas some members demanded that the Financial Equalisa-
tion Act should not just depend on the federal law-maker, but, due
to a future principle of parity of all three tiers, also on the agreement
of the Länder and municipalities, others preferred the present system
of political negotiations where the legal competence to decide on the
Financial Equalisation Act remains with the federal legislature (with
or without an absolute veto of the Federal Council), possibly after the
failure of a mediation process. The Länder were partly criticised for
not using their tax-raising powers sufficiently in order to finance their
own tasks, but asking the federation to grant them more revenues
instead. According to the Länder, however, an intensive use of Land
tax-raising powers – presently, these powers are very limited – would
endanger the homogeneity of the Austrian economic area Land, be
detri-mental to the mutual solidarity between the Länder as well as
to EU endeavours to create a homogeneous European taxing area.
Moreover, the “principle of connectivity” would need a revision of
the whole system of tasks, revenues and expenditure, so that the issue
of Länder finances could not be divided from the future allocation of
Länder powers.
It was highly controversial whether the consultation mechanism
should be made applicable within the framework of financial equa-
lisation – which is not the case presently – or whether the informal
67. See 1/ENDB-K of 31 January 2005, part 3, page 224 ff.
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68. See 1/ENDB-K of 31 January 2005, part 3, page 212 ff.
“financial equalisation pact” that usually emanates from political ne-
gotiations should be concluded as an agreement under Art 15a B-VG
or as a legal source of its own kind to which ordinary laws should
adhere under all circumstances. This was opposed with the argument
that deadlocks and blockades in the process of enacting financial
equalisation should be prevented.
In principle, committee members agreed that financial equalisa-
tion should have a three-tier-basis, namely to relate to the federation,
Länder and municipalities respectively. It was agreed that financial
equalisation should have a vertical and a horizontal dimension, but
dispute arose as to the criteria according to which horizontal equali-
sation should be arranged.
Although there was unanimity that the three tiers should co-or-
dinate their budgets in order to allow for a macroeconomic balance,
it was unclear whether the principles that governed the recent stab-
ility pact should be incorporated into the Federal Constitution, leav-
ing the conclusion of new stability pacts to a co-operative process bet-
ween the tiers, or whether just the authorisation to conclude stability
pacts should become part of the Federal Constitution. A similar discus-
sion arose as to the future embodiment of the consultation mecha-
nism and its extended application.
Despite the necessity to simplify the current system of financial
transfers, the future method and criteria of subsidiary allotments (“sec-
ondary financial equalisation”) remained contentious.
4.5. Administrative Courts in the Länder
One of the reform options likeliest to be realized concerns the
establishment of administrative courts in the Länder, which was agreed
by Committee no. 9.68 As yet, the Länder do not take part in the judi-
ciary, and although various branches of civil and criminal courts are
located in the Länder, the latter are not responsible for them, whilst
the Supreme Court, Constitutional Court and Administrative Court are
located in Vienna.
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The Administrative Court currently consists of one instance, which
is also one of the reasons why the Court’s decisions take such a long
time. For many years, a discussion has been led as to whether the Ad-
ministrative Court should be released from part of its tasks by the es-
tablishment of administrative courts in the Länder. On the one hand,
such a solution could benefit those that sought legal protection, since
their appeals could be dealt with much more rapidly. On the other
hand, this would strengthen the principle of federalism, as the Länder
would for the first time be entitled to exercise judicial functions. In
1988, so-called Independent Administrative Senates were established
in the Länder, being responsible for a number of tasks, such as decid-
ing on appeals against administrative penalties or coercive measures
or against appeals made against the decisions of district administra-
tive authorities in certain fields that belong to the indirect federal
administration of the Länder.69 These Senates that are neither real
courts nor classical administrative authorities were set up in order to
meet the standards appertaining to a tribunal under Art 6 of the Eu-
ropean Convention on Human Rights. Clearly, this system could be
enhanced by replacing the Independent Administrative Senates by
real administrative courts in the Länder.
Committee no. 9 agreed that such courts should be established:
Namely, 9 Länder administrative courts and 1 federal administrative
court. Normally, there should be one stage of appeal after the deci-
sion taken by an administrative authority, and, instead of another (su-
perior) administrative authority, this appeal should be lodged either
at the Land administrative court or at the federal administrative court
in those cases where an administrative matter (e.g. the law concern-
ing foreigners) specifically demands a central instance. Committee
members also agreed that the administrative courts should be entit-
led to replace administrative rulings by their own decisions provided
that the Länder governments could lodge appeals against these deci-
sions before the Administrative Court in Vienna. The Administrative
Court in its turn should adjudicate upon the decisions made by the
administrative courts of first instance, but only in case of “relevant
legal questions”, which would reduce the number of cases before the
Administrative Court.
69. Art 129a para 1 B-VG.
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5. Concluding Remarks
For many years, a reform of Austrian federalism has been discuss-
ed with much fervour. Over the last 15 years, two opportunities for
a comprehensive “reform package” that had seemed to be within
reach ultimately proved to be a failure. Firstly, Austria joined the Eu-
ropean Union with the consent of the Länder whose claims were sa-
tisfied mainly in as far as their participation within EU law making is
adequately provided by the Federal Constitution, but not as regards
an internal or structural reform of federalism. Secondly, the appoint-
ment of the Austrian Constitutional Convention – that in a way may
have been inspired by the European Convention, but also resumed
previous discussion on the Austrian Constitution – offered an oppor-
tunity of discussing the future of the federal system on a very broad
basis. Indeed, all crucial problems of Austrian federalism were dealt
with by the various committees and proved to be strongly intercon-
nected with many other issues of constitutional reform. Within the
limits set by the Convention’s mandate – namely, not to seriously
amend or abolish the federal system –, the committee papers and final
report display the whole variety of possible reform options that, how-
ever, are frequently incompatible with each other. For a long time,
the reform project has suffered from political inflexibility and inability
to compromise that, eventually, not even the Convention was able to
overcome. Nevertheless, the report proves a valuable document for
the ongoing discussion under the auspices of the constitutional reform
select committee. Whether a parliamentary committee, as a more
classically democratic, but also more restricted forum, will be able to
smooth out the difficulty to find a solution, facing such highly diffe-
rent views, remains to be seen.
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RESUM
Aquest article tracta els diferents debats i intents de reforma del sistema fe-
deral austríac dels darrers quinze anys. L’article parteix d'una perspectiva
històrica que descriu els desenvolupaments més rellevants del federalisme
austríac en el decurs del segle XX, i destaca la importància del procés de cen-
tralització a través de la constant transferència de competències des dels
Länder al Govern federal, així com els diversos debats en aquest sentit. Se-
gons l’autora, des de 1995, any de l’accés d’Àustria a la Unió Europea, s’han
perdut dues grans oportunitats per dur a terme una reforma general del sis-
tema federal que pogués contribuir a compensar el procés de centralització.
La primera oportunitat perduda té referència directa amb la Unió Europea.
Els Länder van accedir a l’adhesió amb la condició que la Constitució fede-
ral preveiés des de diverses dimensions la seva participació en els processos
europeus de presa de decisions, tot deixant de banda l’oportunitat d’apro-
fitar el debat i pressionar per a una reforma estructural del sistema federal.
La segona oportunitat perduda té a veure amb la dispersió de propostes
resultants dels treballs de la Convenció Constitucional Austríaca. La Conven-
ció, creada el 2003, tenia la missió de discutir la reforma de la Constitució en
els aspectes que regulen l’estructura federal del país i, en conseqüència, ela-
borar-ne un primer esborrany. La incapacitat d’establir i definir eixos comuns
de reforma, juntament amb la manca de flexibilitat i de cerca de compromís
polític, van desdibuixar el paper de la Convenció.
ABSTRACT
This article discusses the different debates and attempts to reform the Aus-
trian federal system over the last fifteen years. The article is based on a his-
torical perspective that describes the most relevant developments of Aus-
trian federalism during the 20th century, highlighting the importance of the
centralisation process through the constant transfer of powers from the Län-
der to the Federal Government, as well as various debates in this regard.
According to the author, since 1995, the year of Austrian adhesion to the
European Union, two opportunities have been missed to carry out a general
reform of the federal system which could contribute to compensating the
centralisation process.
The first missed opportunity is directly related to the Austrian adhesion to
the European Union. The Länder agreed to the adhesion under the condi-
tion that the Federal Constitution would include their participation in Euro-
pean decision-making processes. By focussing on this point, the Länder set
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aside the opportunity to take advantage of the debate and, as a consequence,
press for structural reform of the federal system. The second missed oppor-
tunity was related to the dispersion of proposals resulting from the work of
the Austrian Constitutional Convention. The Convention, created in 2003,
had the mission of discussing those aspects of the reform of the Constitution
that regulated the federal structure of the country and, as a consequence,
of making a first draft reform. The incapability of establishing and defining
common ground for reform, together with the lack of flexibility and of
seeking political commitment, weakened the role of the Convention and,
thus, any possibility to carry on with the reform.
